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NOTES
THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY IN
MINERALS IN THE UNITED STATES
I.
The familiar maxim that one who owns land owns it "ad
inferno usque ad caeium" was subject at early common law
to the qualification that if a person owned lands which con-
tained royal mines (gold and silver) the ownership of the mines
rested in the King. The right of the King was first recognized
in an early case between the Queen and the Earl of Northumber-
land., The three reasons as expressed by the Queen's solicitor
for such rights were: first, the analogy between the excellency
of gold and silver and the excellency of the King; second, the
necessity of having those precious metals in order to provide for
the public welfare of the kingdom; third, the coinage of money
to promote commerce. Upon the last reason Blackstone upheld
the King's prerogative right.2
By a later decision, not only was the King's prerogative right
established in mines which contained gold and silver, but it was
also declared that if a copper mine or mine of any other metal
contained gold and silver then such mine was also to be in the
Crown, for the King could not hold jointly with another, nor
could he share his rights with another. 3 But statutes were soon
enacted to overcome the effect of this decision.4
It was only natural that the idea of sovereign rights should
have found its way into the Crown Charters granted to the
early American settlers, and in practically all of them a pro-
vision is made for reserving to the King a certain portion of the
precious metals found. A typical example of such reservation
is found in a charter granted by Queen Elizabeth to Sir Walter
Raleigh, which states: "Reserving always to us our heirs and
successors for all services, duties, and demands the fifth part of
all the ore of gold and silver that from time to time and at all
times after such discovery, subduing, and possessing shall be
there gotten and obtained.""
But not all charters contained the same provision. In Vir-
ginia one-fifteenth of all the copper was reserved., In the grant
to Lord Baltimore, in addition to the gold and silver, the King
reserved one-fifth of all the gems and precious stones found.7
The charter of Carolina reserved a royalty of one-fourth of
' Queen v. Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310, 75 Eng. Repr.
472.
'1 Bla. Comm. 249.
'The Case of Mines (1568) 1 Plowden 336, 75 Eng. Repr. 511.
'1 Wm. & Mary, c. 30 sec. 4; 5 & 6 Wm. & Mary, c. 6 sec. 3.
'1 THORPE, AM. CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANic LAws (1909) 53.
£ 7 ibid. 3790.
'3 ibid. 1677.
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the royal metals plus an annual payment of twenty marks.8
The grant to the Duke of York was different from the others
in that it gave the Duke the metals in the land in return for an
annual payment of forty beaver skins.0 By reason of this New
York has even up to the present day continued to assert such
right, so that all of the gold and silver mines still vest in the
state. °
It almost inevitably followed that the United States should
reserve for itself all the minerals contained in the lands owned
by it. This idea was expressed by the Continental Congress in
a law passed in 1785 providing for the disposition of western
lands. A survey was to be made of the land which was to be
apportioned, with a notation being made of any known mines or
salines, and in case any of these lands were granted a provision
was to be placed in the deed, "excepting therefrom and reserving
one-third part of all gold, silver, lead and copper mines within
the same."11
In 1803 by the Louisiana Purchase the government added to
its domain about a million square miles. In 1807, Congress
passed an act authorizing the President to lease any lead mines
which might thereafter be discovered in the Indiana territory or
in lands contiguous to such territory for a term not exceeding
five years.1 2 This plan was followed by the government for but
a short while, for the leasing of mines proved a failure. The
collection of payments cost more than the amounts collected.
Therefore, upon recommendation by the President, Congress
authorized the sale of the reserved lead mines in Missouri, Illi-
nois, Arkansas, and the territories of Wisconsin and Iowa,13 and
by a later statute the lands containing copper, lead, or other
valuable ores in Michigan and Wisconsin were also ordered
sold.14
By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, July 4, 1848, the United
States acquired another vast tract of land, which now embraces
Utah, Arizona, New Mexico west of the Rio Grande and north of
8 5 ibid. 2743.
93 ibid. 1637.
Not only does the state lay claim to all gold and silver mines, but also
to all mines of other metals discovered on lands of persons not citizens of
the United States; to all mines of other metals discovered upon lands owned
by citizens of the United States, the ore of which on an average shall con-
tain less than two equal third parts in value of copper, tin, iron, and lead or
any of these metals; and to all mines and all minerals and fossils discovered
or hereafter to be discovered upon lands belonging to the state. Consol.
Laws N. Y. (Cahill 1923) c. 47 sec. 80.
' LINDLEY, MINES (3d ed. 1914) 61.
=2 Stat. 449 (1807).
4 Stat. 364 (1807) ; 9 Stat. 37 (1846).
149 Stat. 146 (1847.
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the Gadsden Purchase, Colorado west of the Rocky Mountains,
and the southwestern part of Wyoming. The discovery of gold
in this territory made the shores of the Pacific a magnet for all
fortune seekers. It was imperative that some kind of law be
established for these throngs of varied people. But the Federal
Government took no steps to promulgate rules to govern them,
and as a result the miners looked to themselves for the drafting
of codes of laws which would best serve them. The rules drawn
up were a product of the common-law regulations as found in
respect to the tin mines of Devon and Cornwall in England, the
Mexican ordinances, and the civil law of Spain.15 These impro-
vised codes were later recognized by both State and Federal au-
thority."6
There was not a code that did not provide for some method of
filing claims to the land desired. But since no authority was
given by the government to take the land, the question arises as
to what kind of title these miners obtained. Strictly speaking
they were all trespassers on the property of the United States.
In all general laws granting the right of pre-emption to settlers
upon public lands, mineral lands were excepted'7 and upon the
entrance of a state into the Union such reservation was again
expressly made. "By the act of Congress passed March 3, 1853,
it was provided that all public lands in the State of California,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed excepting mineral lands should
be subject to the provisions of the Act of 1841; and it was further
provided that no person should obtain the benefits of the act by
a settlement or location on mineral lands."'8 Again the superior
right of the United States in mineral lands claimed was recog-
nized in an act providing for a district and circuit court in the
district of Nevada, which stated that no possessory actions be-
tween individuals for the recovery of mining titles or for dam-
ages to any such titles should be affected by the fact that the
paramount title to the land on which such mines lie is in the
United States, but each case shall be judged by the law of pos-
ses-ion."'1
About five years after the discovery of gold in California the
question arose as to who had the property right in the metals in
the mines on privately owned lands-i. e., whether the preroga-
tive right of the state existed in this country as it did in Eng-
land. This question was first answered in the affirmative, in
"YALE MINING LAW AND MINING RIGHTS, 73.
Sparrow v. Strong (1865) 13 Wall. 97; Chambers v. Harrington (1884)
ill U. S. 350; Broder v. Natoma Water Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 274.
"5 Stat. 453 (1841).
" LINDLEY, op. cit. 85.
"13 Stat. 440 (1865), 28 U. S. C. sec. 690.
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the case of Hicks v. Bel 20 where it was held that the state be-
cause of its sovereignty was entitled to the jur regalia which
pertained to the King at common law, and therefore had title to
all the minerals in the state. But this holding was expressly
overruled in the later case of Moore v. Smaw2l where the court
ruled that although the state held certain rights of sovereignty
yet such rights were only those necessary for its existence; and
it was held that the ownership of mines and minerals is not such
a power necessary for its existence. Such decision negatives
all idea of the government's superior right to the minerals in
privately owned land.
In 1866 Congress introduced a new policy in the disposition
of mineral lands, abandoning the idea of abstracting royalties.22
the Act in substance embodied three main principles. First,
that all mineral lands of the public domain should be open to
free exploration and purchase. Second, that rights which had
been acquired in these lands under a system of local rules, with
the apparent acquiescence and sanction of the 'government,
should be recognized and confirmed.23 Third, that titles at least
to certain classes of mineral deposits or lands containing them
might be obtained by patent.
What the Act of 1866 did in regard to obtaining title to mines,
the Act of 1870 did in regard to the owners of placer and other
forms of deposit. 24 By a subsequent act, May 10, 1872,2r these
two previous statutes were practically united in one. By the
present mining act, passed in 1920, although no changes were
made in regard to the manner of disposing of lands containing
metallic minerals, as to non-metallic minerals a new policy was
adopted, namely that of leasing.26 The operation of this Act is
discussed below.
II.
Petroleum has almost everywhere been regarded as a min-
eral.27 Although there are decisions to the contrary, the great
weight of authority holds the substance to be a mineral within
the terms of a grant, lease, or reservation. Such construction
received the sanction of the Land Department until Secretary
Hoke Smith in 1896 ruled that petroleum lands were not mineral
lands and could not be entered under the mining laws. But al-
most immediately Congress voiced its disapproval by enacting a
(1853) 3 Cal. 220.
(1861) 17 Cal. 199.
14 Stat. 251 (1866).
Jennison v. Kirk (1878) 98 U. S. 453.
,416 Stat. 217 (1870), 30 U. S. C. secs. 35, 36.
17 Stat. 91 (1872), 30 U. S. C. sec. 22.
"41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U. S. C. sec. 181.
"MORRISON AND DESOTo, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS (1920) 8.
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statute which ordered: "That any persons authorized to enter
lands under the mining laws of the United States, may enter and
obtain patents to lands containing petroleum, or other mineral
oils, and chiefly valuable therefor under the provisions of the
laws relating to placer mining claims."-
The effect of this statute was to make it more difficult to obtain
oil lands, since the requirements for obtaining mineral lands were
not only more stringent but also more difficult than those for
obtaining public lands. But such law was not adapted to the
exploitation of petroleum. In the first place it gave the pros-
pector no definite rights until discovery, i. e., it was only when
oil actually was discovered that he could obtain title to the land.
As a result of this, fictitious claims were placed upon the land
by other parties as soon as drilling operations began. If' oil
was discovered, there was no assurance that the discoter§r
would obtain title, since it was always possible for one of 'the
fictitious claimants to receive title first. In the second pl4c.,
the law required the performance of assessment work regardless
of the need for oil. Quite often this led to waste, for even if oil
was discovered the locators were required to perform their de-
velopment work until the time when they received patents to the
land. Means of escaping this provision of the statute were suc-
cessfully devised, until finally Congress enacted a law which
permitted the work on one claim to be sufficient for five, "lying
contiguous and owned by the same person or corporation.1'29 A
third defect of the law was that it provided for dispositions of
tracts too small for efficient operation, and so made it necessary
for the oil operators to use dummy entry men in order to get
large enough tracts. In one instance one company filed claims
upon 40,000 acres of land by the use of different powers of
attorney.
However, about the same time the necessity of conserving our
valuable mineral lands arose; for it was seen that if wasteful
exploitation of our reserves was permitted, our supply would in
a short time be exhausted. As a result of such forethought,
President Roosevelt appointed a commission to examine the then
existing conditions of our public lands, with an effort to de-
termine what resources were obtained therein. As a result of
such survey, President Taft, who had then come into office,
ordered in 1909 S0 about 2,000,000 acres of supposedly oil-bearing
lands in California, placed in a state of temporary reservation in
"aid of proposed legislation affecting the use and disposition of
petroleum deposits in the United States." Whether such acts of
'29 Stat. 526 (1897).
'32 Stat. 825 (1903), 30 U. S. C. sec. 102.
" Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal Order No. 5 (Sep. 29, 1909).
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the President were constitutional was not presented for judicial
determination, for such action was later confirmed by Congress
in a law which specifically conferred upon the President those
powers which he had exercisedA1 Subsequently, the President
having such power, more withdrawals were ordered so that by
1916, 5,587,077 acres of public land had been withdrawn from
exploitation.
As a result of this policy a conflict arose between the govern-
ment, which wished to preserve the oil, and the acquisitive inter-
ests which wished to obtain it. The latter group was reinforced
by those who believed that the public lands should go to the states
for the purpose of advancing their economic development. Be-
tween 1910 and 1920 no session of Congress failed to have before
it the question of the disposition of public oil lands, and although
various bills were introduced in regard to such disposition, none
of any real importance was passed until 1920, when the govern-
,mental policy in regard to the future acquisition of oil lands was
announced.32
The main features of the Act of 1920 were: The Secretary of
the Interior was authorized to issue prospecting permits for oil
and gas on tracts of not more than 2560 acres, for a term not
exceeding two years. Title to mineral deposits could no longer
be secured under patent except such deposits as were included in
valid locations existing at the date of the Act. The right to
produce such minerals could be secured only under permits
and/or leases issued by the government, such leases or permits
reserving substantial royalties to the government. The acreage
which an individual or corporation could operate directly or in-
directly was limited. Operations were required to be conducted
under the supervision of the Department of the Interior. The
state in which the minerals were to be extracted was given a
share of the royalties resulting therefrom."3 Consent was given
to taxation of the property of producing agencies by the states.
The policy of the statute as to the issuance of permits and
licenses was complied with from the time of the passage of the
Act in 1920 until larch 12, 1929, when President Hoover issued
the following statement: "There will be no leases or disposals
of government oil lands no matter what category they lie in, of
government holdings or government controls except those which
may be mandatory by Congress. In other words there will be
complete conservation of oil in this administration.!'" The Sec-
"36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U. S. C. Sec. 141.
" IsE, THE UNITED STATES OIL POLICY (1926) 330.
From the time of the passage of the act until June 30, 1929, states have
received as royalties the amount of $23,820,929.32. ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR (1929) p. 124.
71 CONG. REC. 2646 (1929).
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retary of the Interior has issued regulations to carry out this
announced policy.
But the President in announcing his new policy did not settle
the problem of oil land disposition, but instead opened the whole
question anew. Those who oppose the order point to the Act
of 1920 as their main support and raise the following issues.
The title of the statute reads: "An act to promote the mining of
coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas and sodium on the public do-
main.'3 It will be noticed that the statute reads to promote the
development, not to restrict it. However, the President's order
provides for restriction, not promotion. The enacting clause
reads: "That deposits of oil or gas, and lands containing such
deposits owned by the United States . . . shall be subject to dis-
position in the form and manner provided for by this act to
citizens of the United States."'3 The President, it is contended,
is changing the word "shall" to "may." Section 35 reads: "That
37Y2 per cent of the amounts derived from such bonuses, royal-
ties, and rentals shall be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury
after the expiration of each fiscal year to the state within the
boundaries of which the leased lands or deposits are or were lo-
cated, said money to be used by such state or subdivisions
thereof for the construction and maintenance of public roads or
for the support of public schools or other educational institutions
as the legislature of the state may direct."'' 3  Section 32 reads:
"That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe
necessary and proper rules and regulations and to do any and
all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the purposes of
this act: Provided that nothing in this act shall be construed or
held to affect the rights of the state . . . to exercise any rights
which they have." 8
The contention is raised that by section 35 the United States
has become a trustee for the states to pay 37I2 per cent of all
the revenue received under the act and that the trust should not
be terminated by executive order. The question as to section
32 is whether the Secretary of the Interior can by a blanket
order in the guise of a regulation refuse to issue any more
permits.
In criticizing the President's action, Senator Cutting of New
Mexico stated: "If the leasing act has outlived its value and its
usefulness it is the duty of Congress to deal with the matter and
provide an alternative which shall be better."39
The President and those who agree with his policy seem large-
ly to ignore the legal aspect of the situation, and defend their
action chiefly on the basis of conservation. Their attitude is
' 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U. S. C. sec. 181.
"Ibid., sec. 438. 'Ibid., sec. 450.
"Ibid., sec. 450. M 71 CONG. REC. 2645 (1929).
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best summed up in a letter by the President to Joseph H. Dixon,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior. He writes: "I know that
the western as well as the eastern states agree that abuse of
permits for mineral development or unnecessary production or
waste in our natural resources of minerals, is a matter of deep-
est concern and must be vigorously protected. Because of such
abuse and waste I recently instituted measures to suspend fur-
ther issue of oil prospecting permits on public lands and to clean
up the nuisance of outstanding permits and thereby clear the
way for constructive legislation. . . .On the 12th of March
(1929) there were prospecting permits in force covering over
40,000,000 acres of public domain. We have determined that
over 40 per cent of these holders had not complied with the re-
quirements of the law, that the larger portion of these licenses
were being used for the purpose of preventing others from en-
gaging in honest development and some even as a basis of 'blue
sky' promotions. After yielding to the dormants the widest
latitude to show every genuine effort at development under the
outstanding prospecting permits, the total will probably be re-
duced to about 10,000,000 acres, upon which genuine develop-
ment is now in progress. The public domain is, therefore, being
rapidly cleared of this abuse. The position is already restored
to a point where measures can be discussed which will further
effectually conserve the nation's resources, and at the same time
take account of any necessity for local supplies. '40
The issue between the executive and those who disapprove of
the President's action will doubtless be settled ultimately by the
Supreme Court.
TOBIAS LEWIN, '32.
71 CONG. REC. 3572 (1929). For other expressions see 71 CONG. REC.
2641, 2646, 3169 et seq. (1929).
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